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Abstract 
In recent years, rapid technological developments in the field of neuroimaging have provided 
new methods for assessing residual cognition, detecting consciousness and even communicating 
with patients who clinically appear to be in a vegetative state. Here, I highlight some of the major 
implications of these developments, discuss their scientific, clinical, legal and ethical relevance, 
and make my own recommendations for future directions in this field.   
 
Main Text  
The vegetative state is a clinical condition that is often described as ‘wakefulness without 
awareness’. These patients open their eyes, frequently move spontaneously, and will often 
exhibit sleeping and waking cycles, although remain entirely non-responsive to any form of 
external prompting or stimulation (beyond simple reflexes). On this basis, it is assumed they lack 
any awareness, including who they are, where they are, and the predicament they are in. 
However, it is now well accepted that around 40% of these patients are misdiagnosed and will 
show reproducible behavioural signs of awareness when examined by specialised clinical teams. 
Nevertheless, many covertly aware patients escape detection altogether, even by experienced 
teams, and can remain erroneously diagnosed as being in a vegetative state for decades.  
 
In 2006, we put a young woman who had been diagnosed as being in a vegetative state into a 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner and asked her to imagine she was playing 
a game of tennis (Owen et al., 2006). What we found has had repercussions for clinical care, 
diagnosis, prognosis and medical-legal decision-making after severe brain injury, but it also sheds 
light on more basic scientific questions about the nature of conscious behavior and the neural 
representation of our own thoughts and intentions. My goal in this NeuroView is to briefly review 
the most important of these issues, and to make some suggestions about where I think the field 
should go from here.  
  
When we asked our patient to imagine playing tennis, fMRI activity increased in the premotor 
cortex, an area of the brain known to be involved in initiating and imagining movements. When 
we asked her to relax, activity in this region diminished. We had seen this pattern many times in 
studies of healthy participants, who we had also asked to imagine playing tennis in the scanner. 
We then asked the patient to imagine moving from room to room in her house and a very 
different pattern of fMRI activity emerged. This included the parietal cortex and part of the 
parahippocampal gyrus, two brain regions that are known to be involved in spatial navigation. 
Again, this pattern of fMRI activity was indistinguishable from that seen in healthy participants. 
  
On the basis of these fMRI findings, we concluded that our patient was not vegetative at all, but 
conscious and aware, despite the fact that she had been entirely physically non-responsive for 
more than 5 months at that point.  
 
Our reasoning was simple; following a severe brain injury, when the request to move a hand or 
finger is followed by an appropriate and reliable motor response, it is deemed sufficient to 
conclude that the patient is aware. By analogy, if the request to imagine playing tennis is followed 
by an equally reliable fMRI change in a predefined brain region (in this case, the premotor cortex), 
shouldn’t we give that response the very same weight? Skeptics may argue that brain responses 
are somehow less physical, reliable or immediate than motor responses but, as is the case with 
motor responses, all of these arguments can be dispelled with careful measurement, replication 
and objective verification. Replication was integral to our initial study, because the distinct 
patterns of fMRI activity in response to the two imagery tasks were observed across repeated 
trials (Owen et al., 2006). Indeed, our patient’s responses were consistent enough to allow us to 
draw far more elaborate conclusions than just the fact that she was ‘consciously aware’. For 
example, at the very least, sustained attention (required to maintain focus throughout each task), 
language comprehension (required to understand the task instructions), response selection 
(required to switch between alternate tasks) and working memory (required to remember which 
task to perform when instructed), must have all been substantially intact for these fMRI 
responses to occur at all. These are all aspects of ‘top-down’ cognitive control that are typically 
associated with normal levels of conscious awareness.  
 
In a follow-up study, we reported that around 17% of a group of patients who behaviourally 
appeared to be entirely vegetative, were in fact conscious and able to generate reliable responses 
of this sort in the fMRI scanner (Monti et al., 2010). However, the main focus of that study was a 
traumatically brain-injured patient who had been repeatedly diagnosed as vegetative over a five-
year period. By imagining playing tennis to convey a “yes” response and imagining walking 
around his house to convey a “no” response, this patient was able to communicate the answers 
to a series of biographical questions, such as whether he had brothers or sisters, and the last 
place he’d visited before his accident 5 years earlier – all pieces of information that we did not 
know at the time, but could verify as being correct with the family at a later date. Despite these 
astonishing results, it remained completely impossible to establish any form of traditional 
communication at the bedside (i.e. through speech, limb movement, eye-blinks etc).  
 
Many groups around the world have now gone on to use techniques like these to detect covert 
awareness in patients who appear to be clinically vegetative. A recent independent review of 37 
published studies and 1041 patients confirmed our initial estimate, that around 20% are covertly 
aware, despite being entirely behaviourally non-responsive (Kondziella et al., 2016). So, let me 
now consider what these findings mean for our understanding of conditions like the vegetative 
state and for how we think about consciousness more generally.  
 
First, they immediately raise the possibility that many of the patients who have been diagnosed 
as vegetative worldwide - and there are hundreds of thousands - might not be vegetative at all, 
but simply physically non-responsive and trapped in their immobile bodies. Technically these 
  
patients have not been misdiagnosed, in the sense that an error of judgment has been made, 
because the accepted diagnostic criteria are based on behaviour and they really do exhibit no 
behavioural markers of awareness. Nevertheless, the existing criteria do not accurately capture 
their actual state of awareness and, in this sense, their vegetative state diagnosis is clearly 
incorrect. On this basis, I would argue that there is an urgent need for a re-evaluation of the 
existing diagnostic guidelines for all behaviourally non-responsive patients and for the formal 
inclusion of fMRI into those guidelines. 
 
Some steps in this direction have been made; both the Royal College of Physicians in the UK 
(2015) and the American Academy of Neurology in the US (2018) have recently recognized that 
fMRI may be important for the management of vegetative state patients. But this is not enough. 
This is already a mature field, with many validated methods available for assessing cognition, 
detecting awareness, and even communicating with covertly aware patients, based solely on 
their fMRI responses. In my view, functional neuroimaging should already be the standard of care 
for patients who appear to be non-responsive following a serious brain injury. That is not to say 
it is applicable, or even necessary, in every single case. For example, in addition to considerations 
of scanner availability, the physical stress incurred by patients as they are transferred to a suitably 
equipped fMRI facility can be significant. Some patients are unable to remain still in the scanner, 
while metal implants, including plates and pins, which are common following any serious injury, 
may rule out fMRI altogether. Nevertheless, if functional brain imaging was adopted more widely 
in this population, diagnostic accuracy would undoubtedly improve dramatically.  
 
Second, these findings have important implications for the law; in particular, for the increasing 
number of legal cases that have raised the possibility of using fMRI to inform judicial decisions 
about the prolongation, or otherwise, of life after severe brain injury. In most of these cases, the 
key medical and legal decisions revolve around several inter-related factors: i) whether the 
patient is conscious or ‘aware’ of their condition ii) whether there is any chance of significant 
recovery; and iii) what the patient would have said, had they had been consulted about their 
current condition in advance. It is now absolutely unassailable that fMRI can detect covert 
awareness in some patients who appear to be entirely vegetative and, subject to the appropriate 
quality controls and scientific guidance, there is no a priori reason why such data could not be 
used to guide a court’s opinion about “whether the patient is conscious or ‘aware’ of their 
condition”. The case for using functional neuroimaging to predict whether a patient might 
experience some recovery is also compelling. For example, Di et al. (2008), reviewed 15 separate 
studies involving 48 published cases and concluded that functional neuroimaging can predict 
recovery from the vegetative state with 93% specificity and 69% sensitivity. Similarly, in a study 
of 41 patients, Coleman et al. (2009) showed that the results of fMRI testing correlated 
significantly with subsequent recovery, while a specialist behavioural assessment did not. The 
third factor is perhaps more controversial, but in my opinion, equally compelling; using the 
technique introduced by Monti et al., (2010), it is entirely possible to ask a covertly aware patient 
if they want to continue living in their current situation, obviating any need to determine what 
they “would have wanted” in advance. What is most tantalizing about this prospect is that it 
would allow a seriously brain-injured patient to express their current wishes, which may well 
have changed radically in the interval (sometimes decades) since they expressed any premorbid 
  
opinion. With that said, would a “yes” or a “no” response be sufficient to be sure that the patient 
retained the necessary cognitive and emotional capacity to make such an important decision? 
Clearly much more work needs to be done and many more questions would need to be asked of 
a patient before one could be sure that this was the case and, even then, new ethical and legal 
frameworks would need to be introduced to determine exactly how such situations are managed, 
and by whom. But ultimately, the morally challenging question of whether theirs is a life that is 
“worth living” (Kahane and Savulescu, 2009) is one that could be answered directly by the 
patient, using fMRI.  
 
In the more immediate term, fMRI is already being used to involve some covertly aware patients 
in their own day-to-day therapeutic care and management. For example, we have described one 
patient, who had been repeatedly diagnosed as vegetative for twelve years, yet was able to 
provide correct answers to 12 different questions across several fMRI sessions, including whether 
he was in any physical pain (twice he reported that he was not) and whether he still enjoyed 
watching hockey on TV (he did) (Fernández-Espejo and Owen, 2013).  
 
Despite this promising start, communication with entirely physically non-responsive patients is 
still very much in its infancy. Yet, twenty years from now, so-called brain-computer interfaces, or 
BCIs, will likely be as commonplace as smartphones, flatscreen TVs, and mobile touchscreen 
devices. A BCI takes a brain response, analyzes it, and turns it into an action that reflects the 
user’s intention. That action might be as simple as moving a cursor across a computer screen (e.g. 
to spell a word), or as complex as manipulating a robot arm to drink a cup of coffee. fMRI is not 
well suited for such applications because of its size, lack of portability and relatively high cost. 
BCIs based on electroencephalography (EEG) already exist, but vary widely in terms of their 
accuracy and ease of use, and typically require visual fixation (e.g. to an array of letters). This 
precludes their use by most physically non-responsive patients who, by definition, cannot 
purposely direct their gaze. Functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS), is another technology 
that is evolving rapidly with brain computer interface applications in mind. fNIRS systems detect 
where cortical activity is occurring by measuring how much near-infrared light is absorbed by 
blood vessels at specific wavelengths, which varies depending on how much oxygen is in the 
blood running through them. Unlike fMRI, fNIRS is portable, silent and relatively cheap. We have 
recently used this technique to communicate with a behaviourally non-responsive patients who 
was admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU) with Guillain-Barré syndrome (Abdalmalak et al., 
2017). By imaging playing tennis for “yes” and relaxing for “no”, the patient was able to answer 
several clinically important questions about his wishes and well-being, including whether he felt 
safe and whether he was in any pain. 
 
Which brings me to my final question; where do we go from here? We know that fMRI can be 
used to assess residual cognition, detect consciousness and even communicate with patients who 
clinically appear to be in a vegetative state, but what is the next big frontier? In my opinion, this 
field now needs to apply what has been learned from two-decades of functional neuroimaging 
studies in chronic vegetative state patients to the acute phase of brain injury; that is, to the first 
few days after a serious injury when patients are at their most vulnerable and prognosis is most 
uncertain. Coma following a severe brain injury is a medical emergency and requires immediate 
  
admission to an ICU for life-sustaining therapies such as airway management and vascular 
support. A comatose patient will, at most, open their eyes to painful stimuli, but will not track 
with their eyes or fixate. Accurate diagnosis and prognostication are extremely challenging and 
treatment decisions are typically based on unreliable behavioural responses, which are highly 
dependent on a multitude of clinical and environmental factors, rather than on objective and 
quantifiable indicators. Mortality rates approximate 40% in this population, and most of these 
deaths (70%) are associated with withdrawal of life-sustaining therapy based on these outdated 
clinical indicators (Turgeon et al., 2011). Just as it has in chronic conditions like the vegetative 
state, fMRI has the potential to improve diagnosis and provide a point-of-care system that can 
accurately predict outcomes for unresponsive, brain-injured patients in the ICU. Of course, 
neuroimaging studies in this population are not only technically challenging, but pose even more 
difficult ethical issues than the studies that we, and others, have conducted in chronic vegetative 
state patients (Weijer et al., 2015). For example, how and when should the results be used to 
inform clinical decision-making and how best to balance the risks associated with scanning these 
patients against the potential clinical and scientific benefits of fMRI? Clearly more work needs to 
be done, but in my opinion there remains little doubt that functional neuroimaging has the 
potential to significantly and directly impact the assessment and clinical care of critically-ill 
patients in the earliest stages of a brain injury. As a result, it will inform medical ethics and legal 
discussions (in terms of withdrawal of life-sustaining therapies), and drive efforts to develop 
interventions to facilitate recovery and quality of life in these patients. 
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